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Abstract: In 2005, Sony shipped millions of compact discs ("CDs")
containing Digital Rights Management ("DRM") software. The
software acted much like spyware, in that it allegedly installed itself on
user computers without consent, concealed its presence on user
computers, monitored user activity, and collected and transmitted
data regarding user listening habits. The result was a public uproar,
with many users calling for a boycott of Sony products due in part to
the software creating serious privacy concerns. In response, Sony
defended its product by claiming that the software included on its CDs
was merely a DRM measure designed to protect its intellectual
property rights.
In the aftermath of this controversy, it remains unsettled whether,
in the future, other entertainment companies will attempt to enforce
their intellectual property rights through DRM measures. Such future
attempts to implement DRM may lead to other consumer protection
violations not covered by currently existing legal remedies. This
possibility, combined with the fact that DRM may already take away
consumer rights under preexisting copyright law, suggests the need
for an entirely different statutory scheme that regulates exactly what
types of DRM measures copyright owners may take.
This comment explores these concerns by: (i) providing
background information about DRM; (2) discussing the facts
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surrounding the Sony scandal, describing the technology that Sony
used, and providing details regarding the legal consequences that
Sony faced as a result of its actions; and (3) proposing possible
solutions to overreaching DRM schemes. Although current legal
remedies may properly deter copyright owners from mimicking Sony's
actions in the future, the Sony CD copy protection scandal illuminates
the need for consumer protections requiring explicit disclosure,
stringent standards for what DRM software can and cannot do, and
independent review of DRM to ensure compliance.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT You DON'T KNOW CAN HURT You
Imagine, for a moment, that you have just arrived at your office.
You log on to your computer, check your e-mail, and launch your web
browser to perform some legal research. Wishing to enhance your
work experience, you decide to insert a music compact disc ("CD"),
given to you last weekend as a birthday present, into the CD drive of
your computer. Much to your surprise, the media player program that
you usually utilize to listen to CDs on this computer does not
automatically begin playing your CD; instead, an end-user license
agreement ("EULA") appears on your computer monitor. Being the
seasoned professional that you are, you skim through the EULA and
conclude that the music CD contains standard digital rights
management ("DRM") software and that agreeing to it will allow you
to listen to your CD, albeit only on the proprietary media player
provided with the CD. Seeing no problem with this, you agree, and
continue with your research. When the CD reaches the end of its final
track, you eject the CD and continue with your work, believing that
nothing is amiss. Unfortunately for you, your new CD-completely
without your knowledge-has just installed software that will continue
to run on your computer after you have ejected the CD. This software
will hide its constituent files and associated information, drain your
computer's resources, and create security holes that may subject your
computer to viruses and compromise confidential personal and client
information.
The situation described above may sound overly dramatic, but is
realistic in light of the Sony BMG CD copy protection scandal.1 Mark
Russinovich, the man who discovered Sony's secretly installed
software, known as a "rootkit,"2 posted his findings on his blog on
October 31, 2005.3 Sony had already shipped 4.7 million CDs
1 See, e.g., John Borland, Sony CD Protection Sparks Security Concerns, CNET
NEWS.COM, Nov. 1, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Sony+CD+protection+sparks+security+concerns/21oo-7 3 55 -3-
5926657.html.
-A rootkit is "[a] type of Trojan that keeps itself, other files, registry keys and network
connections hidden from detection." See Definition of: rootkit, PC MAGAZINE,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/o,2542,t%3Drootldtfi%3D 55 73 3 ,oo.asp (last
visited Mar. 11, 20o8).
3 Mark's Blog, http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2oo 5 /10/31/sony-
rootkits-and-digital-rights-management-gone-too-far.aspx (Oct. 31, 2005,11:04 CST).
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containing the software over a period of eight months, and by the time
the software was discovered, over 2.1 million of those CDs had been
sold.4 Serious concerns over computer security led to public uproar
and a subsequent call to boycott Sony products.5 In response, Sony
claimed that the software included on its CDs was merely a DRM
measure designed to protect its intellectual property rights. 6
Less than a month later, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott sued
Sony under the Texas Consumer Protection Against Computer
Spyware Act, alleging that "SONY ha[d] engaged in a technological
version of cloak and dagger deceit against consumers by hiding secret
files on their computers .... Consumers who purchased a SONY CD
thought they were buying music. Instead, they received spyware that
can damage a computer, subject it to viruses and expose the consumer
to possible identity crime."7 The Texas Spyware Act took effect on
September 1, 2005, just two months prior to the discovery of Sony's
rootkit and, coincidentally, the Texas suit was the first spyware
enforcement action in the United States.8 The lawsuit sought
$100,000 for each violation, the maximum penalty under the Texas
Spyware Act.9
Following the Texas filing, Sony became the subject of
investigations by thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, the
4 John Borland, Sony Recalls Risky 'Rootkit' CDs, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Sony+recalls+risky+rootkit+CDs/21o-7349-3-5954154.html.
5 Brian Krebs, Study of Sony Anti-Piracy Software Triggers Uproar, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/n/02/
AR2005110202362.html.
6 Id. The protection measure utilized by Sony on its CDs is more appropriately referred to
as copy protection (which is any technological measure designed to prevent copying), but
the author will refer to copy protection and DRM (which is far broader than copy
protection because content owners can regulate more than just copying under DRM
schemes) synonymously throughout this comment because it is the author's intention that
many of the concepts, legal principles, and solutions apply equally to copy protection and
DRM.
7 Press Release, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, Attorney General Abbott Brings First
Enforcement Action in Nation Against Sony BMG for Spyware Violations (Nov. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.php?id=1266 [hereinafter Abbott
Press Release].
8Id.
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Federal Trade Commission, and foreign governments.10 The basis of
these investigations was an allegation that Sony's CDs contained
software that created security holes" and was difficult to remove, and
that Sony had failed to inform consumers of the nature of the
software. For example, former Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro
stated that Sony's DRM software may have violated Ohio's Consumer
Sales Practices Act, which requires that all terms of a product be
disclosed to consumers before they buy the product.12 Moreover,
consumers filed several individual and class action lawsuits against
Sony. 3 These lawsuits sought damages based on a variety of statutory
and common law theories: unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business
practices; misrepresentation; trespass; breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; and breach of warranty. 4 Sony negotiated
to settle these lawsuits and to quell investigations by agreeing to pay
various amounts to the individual states and consumers harmed by
Sony's DRM software. In accordance with the settlement terms, Sony
agreed to take action to reverse the effects of its DRM software, and to
limit its future use of DRM software.5
While legal principles such as trespass, conversion, breach of
warranty, and fraud, as well as existing laws such as anti-spyware
legislation and consumer protection statutes, may provide an effective
penalty for behavior such as Sony's, application of such legal
principles and law may prove to be problematic. 16 For example, one
commentator has noted that most state anti-spyware legislation is
probably unconstitutional, tends to be overly regulatory, and will most
10 See discussion infra Part III.D.
n1 One security issue that Sony's software created was that unauthorized users could take
advantage of the software's rootkdt-like cloaking functionality (by simply adding "$sys$" to
the beginning of a file name) to hide any file (including viruses and other malicious
software) regardless of whether that file was associated with Sony's software or came from
a completely unrelated source. J. Alex Halderman, CD DRM Makes Computers Less
Secure, FREEDOM TO TINKER, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=919.
12 See discussion infra Part III.D.
13 See discussion infra Part III.E.
14 See discussion infra Part III.E.
is See discussion infra Part III.D-E.
16 Susan P. Crawford, First Do No Harm: The Problem of Spyware, 2o BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1433,1436 (2005).
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likely be unsuccessful in stemming the flow of spyware 17
Furthermore, pending federal anti-spyware legislation will preempt
state bills if enacted,18 and even if anti-spyware legislation survives
the preceding criticisms, it does not seem appropriately suited to
address the full scope of the situation illustrated by the Sony scandal.
There are additional factors that mitigate the effectiveness of
existing legal remedies when dealing with invasive and harmful DRM
measures. Under the current legislative scheme, there is a real
possibility that many consumers will unknowingly be harmed by
hidden DRM software. Such prospective harms are enhanced by the
average consumer's relative inability to recognize and analyze the
effects of intrusive and stealthy DRM software on technological
systems. Additionally, even if consumers know they have suffered
harm, some may believe they have no recourse or that it is simply not
worthwhile to pursue legal action against the offending content
provider.
However, the need to protect consumer interests in privacy and
security must be balanced against copyright owners' interest in fully
protecting their intellectual property. While the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") protects copyright owners' use of DRM and
other technological protection measures, it provides no guidance
regarding what types of technological protection are legitimate, as
opposed to those that are abusive. Allowing widely varying state
statutory and common law to provide this missing definition places a
great burden on copyright owners who wish to design their respective
DRM measures to avoid liability; allowing this variance may also run
afoul of the general preemption of state laws affecting matters within
the DMCA. A uniform set of legal principles governing the use of
DRM measures may be more desirable than leaving such regulation to
the existing hodgepodge of state law. Moreover, if such uniform
legislation were to be established, preemptive regulation of DRM
measures-as opposed to retrospective relief-may go a long way
toward alleviating the possibility that consumers will be unable to
protect themselves from, or even detect, abusive DRM measures.
If the software that Sony placed on its CDs was intended solely as
a DRM measure, it stands to reason that Sony and other
entertainment companies will continue to try to enforce their
17 See, e.g., id.
18 Josh Sugnet, Comment, Catching a Black Cat in a Dark Room: Evaluating the
Shortcomings of Federal and State Anti-Spyware Legislation, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 443,458 (2oo6).
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intellectual property rights through similar measures in the future.19
Assuming that this is so, such future attempts to implement DRM may
lead to other consumer protection violations not covered by anti-
spyware legislation or other consumer protection statutes. This
possibility, combined with the fact that DRM may already take away
consumer rights established under preexisting copyright law, suggests
the need for an entirely different body of law that regulates exactly
what types of DRM measures Sony and similarly situated companies
may take.20
This comment explores these concerns. Part II provides
background information on DRM. Part III discusses the facts
surrounding the Sony scandal, describes the technology that Sony
used, and provides details regarding the Texas and other lawsuits filed
against Sony. Finally, Part IV proposes possible solutions to
overreaching DRM schemes. Although anti-spyware legislation may
properly deter Sony and similar companies, the Sony CD copy
protection scandal illuminates the need for consumer protection
against DRM measures in the form of regulations requiring explicit
disclosure, stringent standards for what DRM software can and
cannot do, and independent review of DRM to ensure compliance.
II. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
A. BACKGROUND
DRM technology attained widespread use following the advent of
the digital age.21  The prevalence of many different types of
copyrightable works in digital form, such as music, movies, literary
works, and software, along with the availability of easy-to-use and
inexpensive technology enabling replication, distribution, and high-
speed Internet access, has resulted in many more potential infringers
of copyrighted material.22 This increase in the number of infringers
and cases of infringement has also increased the cost of monitoring
and enforcing against intellectual property rights violations under
19 See Krebs, supra note 5.
20 See Michael Geist, Legal Fallout from Sony's CD Woes, BBC NEWS, Jan. 3, 2oo6,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4577 53 6.stm.
21 Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538 (2005).
22 See id.
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existing law.23 To protect their intellectual property rights in this new
climate, many digital content companies now employ technology-
based restrictions on use of company-owned content.24 In doing so,
these companies essentially forego established legal remedies and
resort to what amounts to "self-help": technological standards created
by the content provider to replace or enhance established legal
protections.25
In describing DRM technologies, Dan L. Burk notes:
[D]igital technologies carry the capacity to embody highly
sophisticated behavioral inscriptions that can accompany
copies of a creative work as they are distributed, controlling
uses of the work. Consequently, because digital technologies
can be scripted to accommodate a variety of user behaviors,
such controls can be scripted to incorporate restrictions that
might otherwise be the subject matter of a written license.26
In other words, DRM technologies, much like licenses, can limit
consumers' use of intellectual property. A key distinction between
DRM and contractual licenses, therefore, is enforcement. Licenses rely
heavily on licensees actually conforming their behavior as agreed
under contract, while DRM technologies place real, technological
limitations on what users may do with the intellectual property.2 7
Moreover, licenses pose added enforcement obstacles since the
governing terms may be held unconscionable; may constitute a
contract of adhesion, or may be unenforceable under state law.28 The
absence of potential contractual liability allows DRM technologies to
provide immediate and uniform enforceability with a reduced
incidence of litigation, at least until the present scandal. Use of DRM
23 Id.
24 Declan McCullagh & Milana Homsi, Leave DRMAlone: A Survey of Legislative
Proposals Relating to Digital Rights Management Technology and Their Problems, 2005
MICH. ST. L. REV. 317,318 (2005).
25 Burk, supra note 21, at 538.
26 Id. at 546 (citation omitted).
27 See id.
28 See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (sth Cir. 1988) (noting that
the district court held the license to be an adhesion contract that would only be enforceable
if allowed by state law).
1Vo1. 4:1
technologies is attractive to intellectual property owners for several
reasons: (1) restrictions on the use of intellectual property are limited
only by owner discretion and not by what Congress and the courts
have provided under the Copyright Act of 1976; (2) the owner does not
have to worry about contractual or license provisions surviving the
scrutiny of the courts because DRM technologies turn restrictions
previously found in licenses and contracts into inherent properties of
content-based products; and (3) DRM technologies lessen the expense
of enforcing restrictions by limiting user behavior instead of relying
on users to conform their behavior.29
A specific example of DRM technology is the Windows Media
DRM, which is designed for use with digital audio and video files and
live broadcasting over the Internet.30 According to Microsoft, this
technology is available for personal computers, portable devices, and
network devices.31 The software locks digital files with a unique
"license key," and encrypts the files so that it is considerably more
difficult to create pirated copies.32 The assignment of a unique license
key makes it possible to associate each instance of the Windows Media
Player software with one computer; every time a user wants to play a
file, the DRM technology ensures that the user has permission to play
that file by checking the user's license key.33 The technology also
protects the audio stream as it travels from the media player software
to the computer's sound card (to prevent programs from copying
content from the audio stream), and provides ways for content owners
to specify different rights for different types of devices. Finally,
Windows Media DRM may "control license start times, stop times,
and duration" and create purchase, rental, and subscription plans for
consumers.
34
29 Id. at 544-48. For more information of digital rights management, see Ariel Katz, The
Potential Demise ofAnother Natural Monopoly: New Technologies and the
Administration of Performing Rights, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 245, 248-52 (2006).
30 Microsoft.com, Features of Windows Media DRM,
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/forpros/drm/features.aspx (last
visited Mar. 11, 20o8).
31 Id. (describing features for "devices such as portable audio and video players, set-top
boxes, and mobile devices with audio and video capabilities" and "DVD players, digital
media receivers, and digital audio receivers").
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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Other corporations have successfully utilized DRM technology to
protect the distribution of their product. To address internal concerns
that its Norton Antivirus 2003 software is one of the most widely
pirated computer applications on the market, Symantec started
distributing copies of the program that are protected by DRM
software.3s While Symantec will not reveal what software it is using,
or the identity of the software's creator, it is known that users will
have to download an activation key and activate the software within
fourteen days of installation. Once the activation key has been
authenticated by Symantec's servers, users may run the antivirus
software, but the DRM software will limit their behavior to comply
with the software's EULA.36
Other examples of recent uses of DRM technologies are Adobe's
Acrobat 7 and LiveCycle.37 These programs provide a wide array of
options for content creators that wish to control access to, and use of,
their intellectual property.38 Some of these options include placing
limitations on printing and modification of documents, as well as
tracking use and setting expiration dates.39 Finally, courts have heard
claims regarding DRM and copy protection measures for protecting
intellectual property as diverse as garage door opener software,4o
music CDs,41 motion picture DVDs,42 computer games,43 and
35 Mark Hachman, Symantec Adds DRM to Norton Antivirus, EXTREMETECH, Apr. 8,
2003, http://www.extremetech.com/article2/o,1697,1164289,oo.asp.
36 Id.
37 John Bringardner, The Three Types of PDF Security, PDFZoNE, Sept. 7, 2005,
http://www.pdfzone.com/c/a/Document-Management/The-Three-Types-of-PDF-
Security/.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1040 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (finding that the plaintiff had not established a connection between the defendant's
universal remote control and unauthorized use of the plaintiffs copyrighted garage door
opener software).
41 See, e.g., Keel v. BMG Entertainment, No. B164476, 2003 WL 22808378, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 26, 2003) (describing controversy relating to the defendant's failure to provide
notice that DRM technology on its music CDs impaired performance).
42 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001)
(affirming a permanent injunction against making available computer software for
Decoding Content Scrambling System-encrypted motion picture DVDs); Paramount
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"system[s] for distributing, retrieving and playing digital audio and
video content via the Internet."44
The current technological and legal landscape presents a
temptation for copyright owners to misuse DRM. First, DRM exists in
a wide variety of forms; it may either accompany individual content-
based products in hard-copy (e.g., CD, Blu-Ray Disc, or DVD) or
digital file (e.g., content files or software distributed over the Internet)
forms, or it may be integrated with devices providing access to content
based products, such as personal computer operating systems.45
Moreover, DRM technology accompanying individual content-based
products may perform a dual role of controlling access to the
individual product that it accompanies and integrating with devices to
control access to other content-based products.46 Second, the DMCA
lacks guidelines pertaining to what types of DRM and other
technological protection measures are permissible, and grants
copyright owners vast freedom to determine how their respective
DRM technologies should be implemented. Third, consumers have no
expectation that products in the marketplace will have concealed
features that operate contrary to their security interests. Finally,
because copyright law grants a monopoly to copyright holders,
consumers may have no access to equivalent alternatives lacking DRM
software. This current combination of technological flexibility, lack of
Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3,
2004) (granting preliminary injunction against identical software); Macrovision v. Sima
Prods. Corp., No. o5-CV-5587 (RO), 20o6 WL 1472152, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 26,2oo6)
(denying a motion to reconsider preliminary injunction that the court issued against
defendant's DVD copy protection circumvention products and stating that "hinder[ing] the
making of videotape copies of protected DVDs... is among a copyright owner's rights").
43 Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Divineo, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment of a DMCA claim against the
defendant for producing devices that circumvent the Sony Playstation video game console's
authentication process).
-RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *1-2
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (enjoining the defendant from generally making available
certain products that allow users to circumvent or modify technological security measures
that plaintiff designed to protect copyright owner's intellectual property available over the
Internet in streaming and downloadable formats).
45 See discussion supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
46 The ability to interface with a device providing access to content may also grant the
ability to alter the operation of that device or to access personal user information stored on
the device.
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clear legislative guidance, consumer ignorance, and absence of
alternative products has created a potentially powerful temptation for
copyright owners to misuse DRM technology.
B. CONFLICTS WITH CONSUMER RIGHTS
1. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
At its core, the Copyright Act of 1976 represents a bargain between
the public and authors.47 In return for a grant of certain exclusive
rights to authors and other copyright owners, the public receives
certain other rights with respect to copyrighted work, as well as the
benefit of access to new expression and knowledge, which ostensibly
contributes to the advancement of society as a whole.48 Because the
DMCA provides penalties for circumvention of technological
protection measures, it essentially provides an incentive for copyright
owners to use DRM and related technologies, leading critics of the
DMCA to claim that the DMCA has allowed the privatization of
copyright law.49
Critics of DRM technology point out that the copyright owners
who limit use of their works with DRM technology can impose
conditions that restrict rights consumers would normally possess
under the Copyright Act of 1976.50 For example, the Copyright Act of
1976 allows for consumers of copyrighted material to assert fair use as
a defense against copyright owners' claims of infringement.5 Other
4717 U.S.C. §§ 1O-81o, 1101 (1976).
48 Stacy F. McDonald, Comment, Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of
Intellectual Property Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50
HOW. L.J. 541,544-51 (2007).
49 Id. at 564.
50 Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1974, 1998 (20O6).
Copyright owners can impose any restriction on consumer use they wish, limited only by
what it technologically possible at any given time. Id.
51 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Fair use can include use "for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research." Id. Other uses of copyrighted material may also
constitute fair use; courts consider four factors, including the "purpose and character of the
use," "nature of the copyrighted work," "amount and substantiality of the portion used,"
and the "effect of the use upon the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted
work." Id.
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defenses under the Copyright Act of 1976 allow users of copyrighted
works to claim justifiable reproduction by libraries and archives52 and
transfer or sale.53
Potentially, DRM technology restricts such lawful uses, which
were unambiguously codified under the Copyright Act of 1976.54
Furthermore, in the absence of an encoded expiration date, DRM
schemes are inextricably embedded in the work that they protect and
will continue to prevent users from lawful use, long after the copyright
term has expired and the work has entered the public domain.55
2. OTHER CONSUMER RIGHTS
In addition to providing copyright owners with the ability to deny
rights provided to consumers under the Copyright Act of 1976, use of
DRM creates the potential for violations of other consumer rights. As
noted above, several factors create the temptation for copyright
holders to misuse DRM, including: (1) the lack of restriction on how
DRM technologies may operate; (2) the ability to design DRM to
interface with, alter the operation of, and access information stored on
devices providing access to copyrighted works; (3) the public's
expectation that products in the marketplace are generally safe to use;
and (4) the unavailability of alternative identical products to
consumers with respect to copyrighted works. The pervasive potential
for misuse has led commentators to complain that if left unregulated,
DRM may result in consumers being subjected to surveillance by
copyright owners.56 Moreover, poorly designed DRM technologies can
create security problems, drain resources, or simply render the
associated copyrighted work incompatible with devices that are
52 Id. § 1o8.
53 Id. § 1o9. This would likely be limited in a DRM context to uses such as electronic
lending or transfer, such as by a library. Zittrain, supra note 50, at 1998.
54Zittrain, supra note 5o, at 1998.
55 Daniel S. Hurwitz, Comment, A Proposal in Hindsight: Restoring Copyright's Delicate
Balance by Reworking 17 U.S.C. § 1201,13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 263, 282-83 (20o6).
56 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Digital Rights Management: Many Technical Controls on Digital
Content Distribution Can Create a Surveillance Society, 5 COLUM. Scl. &TECH. L. REV. 1, 2
(2004), available at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi.?volume=5&article=6; Julie E. Cohen,
DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 580 (2003).
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designed to provide access to copyrighted works.57 To the extent that
DRM technologies begin to take on a surveillance role, critics
complain that "DRM technology is becoming increasingly
indistinguishable from... spyware."58
The public began using the term "spyware" in 1999 to refer to
many different types of unwelcome software, and as a result, several
different definitions for the term exist.59 Ari Schwartz, the Associate
Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, has broadly
defined spyware as "unwanted software that sneaks onto computers
without their owner's consent and cannot be uninstalled." Using
increasingly derogatory language, New York Attorney General Elliot
Spitzer referred to spyware as "fraudulent programs [that] foul
machines, undermine productivity and in many cases frustrate
consumers' efforts to remove them from their computers."6
Spyware can become integrated with a computer user's system in
many different ways.61 Sometimes, it is included in the installation of
other software (and users may actually consent to the installation of
the spyware by agreeing to a lengthy and complex EULA). 62 Spyware
may also install itself onto a computer by exploiting Internet browsers
and operating system security holes, or via virus, worm, or similar
technology.63 The Anti-Spyware Coalition ("Coalition") has neutrally
defined spyware as follows:
57 See Ian Thomson, UK Consumer Group Calls for DRM Legislation, VNUNET.COM, Jan.
17, 2007, http://www.pcw.co.uk/vnunet/news/2148685/consumer-group-calls; Dugie
Standeford, Governments Eye DRM Interoperability Rules as Consumers Vent Over
Access, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=476&res=128o&print=o.
58 Thomson, supra note 57.
59 Sharon Weinbar, The Spyware Inferno, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 13, 2004,
http://news.com.com/2010-1032-53o7831.html.
60 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo, State Sues
Major "Spyware" Distributor: Intermix Media Accused of Vast Pattern of Surreptitious
Installations (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2oo5/apr/apr28a-o5.html.
61 See Sugnet, supra note 18, at 448-49.
62 Id. at 448.
63 Id.
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Technologies deployed without appropriate user consent
and/or implemented in ways that impair user control over:
* Material changes that affect their user experience,
privacy, or system security;
* Use of their system resources, including what
programs are installed on their computers; and/or
* Collection, use, and distribution of their personal or
other sensitive information. 64
The Coalition also notes that many types of software that might be
spyware can also perform functions that are helpful to computer users
when installed on computers pursuant to proper notice, consent, and
control. Therefore, whether users had appropriate notice, consent,
and control over the software is an important factor in determining
whether certain software actually constitutes spyware. 65
Sony's rootkit-like DRM shared many attributes with the
preceding definitions of spyware. As a result, Texas and California
chose to apply their newly enacted spyware statutes to the DRM
technology in litigation seeking redress for their respective citizens.
While anti-spyware legislation may prove to be an effective method of
dealing with overly intrusive DRM technology, it may also prove to be
an invalid or inappropriate means for regulating DRM technology,
especially in light of the fact that anti-spyware legislation was not
specifically designed with DRM in mind. Copyright owners will
possibly use spyware-like DRM technology in the future, and
legislatures should be cognizant of the potential need for DRM-
specific regulation.
A specific DRM technology tied to copyrighted software products
often raises problems of "incompatibility." Either intentionally or
through a design flaw, the supplementary devices can effectively limit
access to the copyrighted work.66 Incompatibility caused by DRM can
64 Anti-Spyware Coalition, Anti-Spyware Coalition Definitions Document,
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/DefinitionsJune292oo6.htm (last
visited Mar. 11, 2008).
65 Id. ("[A] keylogger can be used for legitimate purposes with clear consent, such as letting
an [information technology] help desk remotely assist a user in problem diagnosis. An
underlying technology typically becomes unwanted when it is implemented in a way that
provides no benefit to-or actively harms-authorized users.").
66 Standeford, supra note 57.
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be harmful to consumers by limiting the devices available to access
copyrighted material. 67 France has attempted to deal with this
problem by revising its copyright law to require that copyright owners
using DRM technology disclose information (such as software code)
necessary to ensure interoperability. 68 Other European governments
are currently considering legislation mandating interoperability as
well, but similar legislation in the United States does not appear likely
as of this writing.69
C. RATIFICATION BY THE DMCA
The DMCA's anti-circumvention provisionso indicate
Congressional ratification of DRM technology use, and simultaneously
create the potential for a serious consumer dilemma.7' The DMCA
prohibits three types of circumvention of protection technologies,
including circumvention of access controls, "trafficking in
technologies or devices that circumvent access controls, and . . .
trafficking in technologies or devices that circumvent rights
protection."72 The DMCA exempts specific types of circumvention by
some individuals and entities: (1) the Librarian of Congress; (2)
nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions; (3) law
enforcement, government, and intelligence officers, agents, or
employees; (4) purchasers of protected computer programs who need
to reverse engineer those programs to ensure interoperability with
other computer programs; (5) encryption researchers (typically those
legitimately studying, employed in, or trained and experienced in, the
encryption technology field); (6) parents wishing to limit the Internet
access of their minor children; (7) persons wishing to prevent DRM
technology from disseminating personal information; and (8) persons
67 Center for Democracy and Technology, DRM Metrics-Effect on Use,
http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20o6o9o7drm-metrics-effect-on-use.php (last visited Feb.
27, 2008).
6 8 Standeford, supra note 57.
69 Id.
70 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
71 See Hurwitz, supra note 55, at 276-8o.
72 Stephen E. Blythe, The U.S. Digital Millennium CopyrightAct and the E.U. Copyright
Directive: Comparative Impact on Fair Use Rights, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 111,
111 (2006). For the DMCA provision prohibiting these uses, see Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 12o1(a)-(b) (2000).
[Vol. 4:1
wishing to conduct testing for computer security purposes.73 In
addition, the DMCA allows the Librarian of Congress to make
determinations as to the effect of the prohibition on circumvention of
protection technologies on non-infringing uses and provide
exemptions for classes of copyrightable works based on those
determinations.74
Section 1201(c) of the DMCA indicates that the anti-circumvention
provisions "shall [not] affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses
to copyright infringement, including fair use," which should allay
many of the concerns referenced above, assuming that the average
user has the actual ability to circumvent DRM technology for fair uses,
or once the work has entered the public domain.75 One commentator,
however, argues that the DMCA needs to be amended to allow
circumvention for all non-infringing uses and not just the current
limited exceptions.76 Moreover, courts have thus far held that
§ 1201(c) does not allow users to circumvent DRM technology for fair
uses. Instead, courts would have fair users exercise their rights only if
they can procure a version of the work that has no included DRM
technology (if such a copy exists).77 In other words, a fair user who is
not liable under the Copyright Act for infringement of the copyrighted
work may still be liable on a separate basis for circumvention of a
protection technology.
73 See § 1201(a)-(j).
74 Id. § 12ol(a)(1)(C)-(D). As discussed in Part III.G, the Librarian of Congress has issued
a narrow exemption from the DMCA based on the Sony CD copy protection scandal.
7S Id. § 1201(c).
76 Blythe, supra note 72, at 123-25.
77 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 443 ("Section 1201(c) simply clarifies that the DMCA targets the
circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in
circumvention tools), but does not concern itself with the use of those materials after
circumvention has occurred. Subsection 1201(c)(1) ensures that the DMCA is not read to
prohibit the 'fair use' of information just because that information was obtained in a
manner made illegal by the DMCA."); see also MGM Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1102
("Again, however, while purchasers of DVDs with material in the public domain
unquestionably have the right to make use of this public domain material, they can simply
access it from a non-CSS encrypted DVD or can choose to access and copy this public
domain material in a non-digital form."); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1141 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("[Tlhe argument that Congress' ban on the sale of circumvention
tools has the effect of allowing publishers to claim copyright-like protection in public
domain works is tenuous and unpersuasive.").
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Violation of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions subjects
the violator to civil and criminal liability.78 A violator's civil liability
can include injunctive prohibitions, impoundment of devices or
products involved in a violation, actual or statutory damages, and
court costs.79 A violator's criminal liability can include a fine not to
exceed $500,000 and imprisonment not to exceed five years for the
first offense; however, criminal liability requires that the
circumvention be willful "and for purposes of commercial advantage
or private financial gain," which should theoretically exclude some fair
users from criminal liability.8 ° Facing potential civil or criminal
liability, a consumer who encounters especially intrusive DRM
technology (such as that included on Sony's CDs in 2005), is posed
with a difficult choice: do nothing, and be subject to software that
hides files, drains resources, and creates security holes; or risk liability
under the DMCA by attempting to remove the software or prevent it
from installing on their system. 81
The congressional purpose behind the DMCA, and the courts'
subsequent enforcement, indicate that the legislative and judicial
branches of government have embraced the DMCA's protection of
DRM technology as a legitimate form of self-help for copyright
owners.8 2 Such a result is certainly plausible since DRM technology is
78 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1203-1204 (2000).
79 Id. § 1203. Of course, if the violator had breached the prohibition against circumvention
for a fair use, the copyright owner would be able to show only nominal actual damages; in
the case of a fair use, however, assuming that a copyright owner would want the negative
publicity that would be associated with bringing suit for a fair use violation of the DMCA,
statutory damages between $200 and $2,500 per violation would still be available against
the violator. Id. § 1203(c). While this cost may not be excessive, it would still be a hefty
price to pay for a use that is available to consumers as a matter of right under the Copyright
Act. See id.
8o Id. § 1204.
81 See id. If the software itself collects and disseminates personal information, a consumer
could probably circumvent that software so long as the circumvention was limited to the
part of the DRM technology that performed that function. Id. § 1201(i). Sony's software
apparently did collect and disseminate personal information (and created security holes
that made this type of activity possible), so this exception could apply to the Sony software.
Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, Nov. 17, 2005, WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/o,1848,696ol,oo.html ("Sony claimed the rootkit
didn't phone home when it did.").
82 See, e.g., §§ 1201-05; Corley, 273 F.3d at 443; MGM Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1102;
Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
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usually so integrated with the work it protects that it could be
interpreted to be an inherent characteristic of the product. Under this
theory, consumers would be compelled to accept the product's
limitations when they purchase the product. However, even under
such pretenses, copyright owners need to provide consumers with
adequate notice which fully discloses what types of uses the DRM
technology restricts, because without such notice, consumers cannot
freely accept product limitations imposed by DRM.83 In the
meantime, presumptive judicial and legislative acceptance of DRM
incorporation in copyrighted works leaves consumers seeking
protection from potentially overreaching DRM schemes outside of the
Copyright Act and DMCA (barring revision of those statutes).
III. THE SONY CD COPY PROTECTION SCANDAL OF 2005
A. SONY'S SOFTWARE AND THE ACCOMPANYING
END-USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
The software that Sony utilized to protect its CDs from copyright
infringement-United Kingdom-based First41nternet's Extended Copy
Protection ("XCP") and SunComm's MediaMax-acted as both DRM
technology and spyware.84 As DRM technology, the software allowed
consumers to make a limited number of copies (usually three) of
protected CDs. However, the software copied the Sony CDs in such a
way that consumers could not use those copies to produce additional
copies.85 This type of reproduction, known as "sterile burning,"
enforced DRM restrictions more effectively when combined with the
limitation on the number of copies that consumers could make with
the original CD. 86
When users inserted a protected CD into their computer's CD or
DVD drive, an EULA appeared on their monitors stating that software
on the CD would "'install a small proprietary software program' that
83 Christopher D. Kruger, Comment, Passing the Global Test: DMCA § 12oi as an
International Modelfor Transitioning Copyright Law into the Digital Age, 28 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 281, 286 (2006).
84 Mark's Blog, supra note 3.
85 Sony Tests Technology to Limit CD Burning, CNET NEwS.CoM, June 1, 2005,
http://news.cnet.co.uk/digitahnusic/o,39o29666,39189658,oo.htm.
86 d.
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[would] remain there 'until removed or deleted"'.8 7 If users did not
agree to the EULA, they could not access the tracks on their CDs.8 8
Prior to acceptance of the EUIA, the DRM software monitored other
programs running on the user's computer, and if any of the programs
could be found on a list of about 200 CD ripping and copying
applications, a warning appeared on the user's screen indicating that
the user had to close the ripping or copying program before the user
could access the CD. 89 The software ejected the CD and closed the
application if the user did not comply within thirty seconds.90
Once installed, the software examined each disc inserted into the
user's computer and determined whether it was protected or not. If it
was a protected disc, the software monitored for programs reading the
audio tracks and corrupted the audio before it could reach the reading
program.91 The only way that the software allowed a user to copy or
listen to protected CDs was through a proprietary media player
provided with the CD, and any copies created had DRM restrictions
embedded to prevent any further copying.92
The XCP and MediaMax DRM software acted like spyware in
many ways.93 Both transmitted information about user listening
habits to vendors.94 The data collected included the user's IP address,
and the date, time, and name of the album in the user's computer.95
Additionally, the MediaMax software installed and ran prior to
displaying the EULA, and even if the user did not agree, the software
remained installed on the user's computer.96 Along with the DRM
software, the installer for the XCP software also installed a program
87 Krebs, supra note 5.
88/d.
89 J. ALEX HALDERMAN & EDWARD W. FELTEN, LESSONS FROM THE SONY CD DRM EPISODE 6
(2006).
90 Id.
911d. at 9.
92 Id. at 13.
93 Id. at 14.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 7.
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that effectively concealed any files associated with the DRM software
from the user (similar to a rootkit).97 This rootkit-like software also
caused system instability, drained system resources, and created
operating system security holes that hackers could potentially
exploit.98 Finally, the XCP and MediaMax software was difficult to
remove because neither included any uninstallation software and the
XCP software hid files, making it virtually impossible for the average
user to delete or uninstall the software.99 Moreover, when Mark
Russinovich found the XCP files and deleted them, his CD drive
crashedloo
Even though it described what users could generally do with music
on protected CDs, the EULA that accompanied the XCP and
MediaMax software generally failed to fully disclose the nature of the
software that would be installed onto their computers. 101 Ineffective
or nonexistent notice is one of the defining characteristics of spyware
applications. Sony's MediaMax EULA informed users that the
software did not collect personal information, despite the apparently
contrary collection of personal information.102 The EULAs
conditioned use of digital files on users' continued ownership of the
corresponding CD,1°3 and Sony reserved the right to use all software,
and the accompanying media player, to enforce protection of its
intellectual property assets without providing prior notice of such
97 Id. at 18-19.
98 Id. at 19-20; Mark's Blog, supra note 3; Krebs, supra note 5. "Sony's software could help
hackers circumvent most antivirus products on the market today... installing the Sony
program on a machine running Windows Vista-the beta version of the next iteration of
Microsoft Windows-'breaks the operating system spectacularly."' Krebs, supra note 5.
99 HALDERMAN & FELTEN, supra note 89, at 20.
100 Mark's Blog, supra note 3.
101 BMG Digital Content EULA, http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhalderm/cd3/bmg-
eula.html (last visited Feb. 27, 20o8); Steven Vaughan-Nichols, Sonys Rootkit DRM Raises
Legal Red Flags, EWEEK, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-
Source/Sonys-Rootkit-DRM-Raises-Legal-Red-Flags/.
102 BMG Digital Content EULA, supra note loi; discussion supra Part IIIA.
103 BMG Digital Content EULA, supra note 1O2; Vaughan-Nichols, supra note lol. For
example, if users gave the CD away, or even if they lost the CD or a thief stole it from them,
the EULA terminated users' rights to any copies that were still in their possession.
Vaughan-Nichols, supra note lOl.
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enforcement.o4 Both EULAs generally disclaimed any warranties that
consumers might assert and placed risks of loss or damage on the
consumer.10 5 Both EULAs also purported to limit the liability of Sony
and corresponding parties under a wide array of legal theories arising
out of the EULA terms or the use of the protected materials.1o 6 Sony
reserved the right to update the software as it saw fit; if users did not
update the software, their license to use the protected materials could
be terminated.o7 Finally, the EULAs contained forum clauses
mandating that disputes be resolved in the state of New York, outside
the presence of a jury.08
B. SONY'S INITIAL STEPS AND MOTIVATIONS
Following testing of its DRM software, Sony began releasing CDs
containing the software in March of 2005.109 By the time Mark
Russinovich discovered the rootldt software, Sony had shipped over
4.7 million CDs containing the software, and consumers had already
purchased 2.1 million of those CDs.11° Initial estimates speculated that
the software had been installed onto over half a million computers.,
Thomas Hesse, President of Global Digital Business at Sony BMG,
noted that fighting casual ripping and burning of CDs was a major
concern for his company because two-thirds of all piracy arises from
those activities.112 During the last decade, dealing with CD piracy had
become a serious issue for the recording industry. Early on, the
recording industry focused mainly on Internet fie swapping, but by
2005, the recording industry shifted its focus to widespread CD
104 BMG Digital Content EUIA, supra note IOI; Vaughan-Nichols, supra note ioi.
1o5 BMG Digital Content EULA, supra note 1oi; Vaughan-Nichols, supra note lOl.
106 BMG Digital Content EUIA, supra note iol; Vaughan-Nichols, supra note 1Ol.
107 Vaughan-Nichols, supra note lOl.
108 BMG Digital Content EULA, supra note l1; Vaughan-Nichols, supra note 1Ol.
lo9 Sony Tests Technology to Limit CD Burning, supra note 85.
110 Borland, supra note 4.
1 Schneier, supra note 81.
112 Sony Tests Technology to Limit CD Burning, supra note 85.
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burning.113 Recent research had shown that consumers obtained
twenty-nine percent of their new music through ripping or burning
music CDs.114 Record companies, including Sony BMG, felt that
piracy had caused the industry to lose $4.2 billion each year and, to
Sony, DRM technology potentially provided an answer to declining
sales.n5
C. THE PUBLIC REACrION
The result of Russinovich's October 31, 2005 discovery of Sony's
spyware-like DRM software was public outrage.116 Music fans called
for a boycott against Sony.117 Journalists argued that Sony's behavior
constituted security malpractice.118 Upon discovering that the DRM
software was on Department of Defense computers, the Department
of Homeland Security publicly reprimanded Sony by saying, "It's your
intellectual property. It's not your computer."19 Amazon.com offered
refunds to customers who bought Sony DRM CDs from the website.120
Microsoft announced that it would provide security updates to
Windows users to remove the DRM software.21 On November 10,
2005, the first virus exploiting the Sony DRM software appeared, only
ten days after Russinovich's discovery.122
113 Borland, supra note 1.
114 Id.
115 Krebs, supra note 5.
116 Id.
117 Id.
18 eWEEK Editorial Board, Rootkit DRM Constitutes Security Malpractice, Nov. 28, 2005,
EWEEK, http://www.eweek.com/article2/o,1895,1893785,oo.asp.
119 Dave Methvin, The Sony XCP Rootkit, PCPrrSTOP, Nov. 25, 2005,
http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheek/sonyxcp.asp.
120 Id.
121 Joris Evers, Microsoft Will Wipe Sony's 'Rootkit', CNET NEWS.cOM, Nov. 13, 2005,
http://news.com/Microsoft-will-wipe-Sonys-rootldt/21oo-1oo2-3-5949o41.html.
122 John Borland, Botsfor Sony DRM Pootkit Spotted Online, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 11,
2005, http://news.cnet.co.uk/digitalmusic/o,39o2 9 666,3 9 194 o6o,oo.htm.
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Adding insult to injury, Sony and the DRM software developers'
initial reaction was nonchalant.123 The CEO of First4Internet stated,
"I think this is slightly old news .... For the eight months that these
CDs have been out, we haven't had any comments about malware
(malicious software) at all."124 Sony BMG's president of global digital
business stated that "Most people don't even know what a rootkit is,
so why should they care about it?"125 Researchers found that Sony's
uninstallation patch contained serious security holes.12 6  Sony first
announced that it would stop shipping CDs with the software (but
would not say which CDs had the software on them), then finally
announced a recall of CDs remaining on store shelves, offered to
exchange DRM-less CDs with consumers who had bought the CDs
with DRM on them, and provided a list of CDs containing the
controversial software.27
D. INVESTIGATIONS
In response to the discovery of Sony's rootkit software, Florida and
New York began civil investigations of Sony, and the Milan, Italy-
based Association for Freedom in Electronic Interactive
Communications-Electronic Frontiers Italy ("ALCEI-EFI") urged
Italian prosecutors to initiate a criminal investigation of Sony.28 The
New York Attorney General's office found in its investigation that CDs
containing Sony's software could still be purchased from retail stores
more than a week after Sony had recalled the CDs.129 In a written
123 Borland, supra note 1.
124 Id.
125 Schneier, supra note 81.
126 Methvin, supra note 119.
127 Id. This source contains a hyperlink to the complete list of CDs containing Sony's DRM
software.
128 Arik Hesseldahl, Spitzer Gets on Sony BMG's Case: New York's Attorney General has
Turned His Attention to Sony BMG's Copyright-Protection Fiasco, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov.
29, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2oo5/
tc20051128_57356o.htm; Posting of Kurt Opsahl to Electronic Frontier Foundation
Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/oo4292.php (Jan. 3, 2006);
Robert McMillan, Italian Police Asked to Investigate Sony DRM Code: Also, Computer
Associates Brands Sony Code 'spyware', PC WORLD, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,123454-page,1/article.html.
129 Id.
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statement, New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer stated that "[i]t is
unacceptable that more than three weeks after this serious
vulnerability was revealed, these same CDs are still on shelves, during
the busiest shopping days of the year [late November of 2005]."130 As
investigations of Sony's DRM software continued, thirty-six other
states and the District of Columbia joined Florida and New York in a
consortium led by Massachusetts.131 The states alleged that Sony's
software created security holes which lead to potential computer
failure, that Sony failed to inform consumers of the nature or
existence of the software, and that the XCP software specifically hid
itself from consumers once downloaded to their computers.
3 2
According to Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro:
"The Consumer Sales Practices Act states that all terms of a
product must be disclosed to the consumer before they buy
it. Sony's hidden software violated Ohio laws and put
consumers' computers at risk .... Companies selling CDs
and computer software need to disclose all that the
consumer will be getting with the purchase."33
This investigation never became a formal lawsuit; Massachusetts
announced on December 21, 2006, that it had reached a settlement
agreement in which Sony agreed to pay $4.25 million to the
consortium and up to $175 to consumers whose computers were
damaged by Sony's software. 134 Additionally, "[t]he injunctive relief
130 Id.
131 Greg Sandoval, Sony BMG Settles Rootkit Case with 39 States, CNET News.com, Dec.
21, 2oo6, http://news.com.com/Sony+BMG+settles+rootldt+case+with+39+states/2ioo-
1027__3-6145714.htmil. The members in the consortium included Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.
See Ohio, 39 States Settle with Sony BMG over Anti-copying Software, INS. J., Dec. 28,
2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2oo6/12/28/75485.htm.
132 Ohio, 39 States Settle with Sony BMG over Anti-copying Software, supra note 131.
133 Id.
134 Press Release, Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, AG Reilly Secures $4.25
Million Settlement with Sony BMG: Leads 40 States to Resolve Hidden Anti-copying
Software Issue (Dec. 21, 2oo6); Sandoval, supra note 131 ('The 13 states that started the
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provisions of the settlement will specifically prohibit SONY BMG from
using XCP or MediaMax DRM software in the future, and will sharply
limit the ways in which anti-copying software may be used in the
future."135 As of this writing, no information appears to be available
regarding the result of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fraud Contrast
Group of the Financial Police in Italy's ("Guarda di Finanza") criminal
investigation prompted by ALCEI-EFI or whether such an
investigation has even taken place. ALCEI-EFI asked the Guarda di
Finanza to "identify the authors of the software, and those who made
the willful decision of distributing it in a hidden form, and also detect
if other organizations committed similar abuses."136 According to
ALCEI-EFI, guilty persons could be charged with "arbitrarily 'self-
made' justice, intentional damage to computer systems, and diffusion
of software that damages information and communication systems."137
The Federal Trade Commission initiated its own investigation into
Sony's software. The FTC and Sony settled this investigation on terms
similar to those in the state consortium settlement agreement,
including compensation for damage to computers, exchange of CDs,
limitations on Sony's use of DRM software in the future, and
monitoring by the FTC to ensure compliance with the agreement.3 8
E. CLASS ACTIONS FILED AGAINST SONY
Individuals filed several lawsuits against Sony in November
2005.139 These included Guevara v. Sony BMG Music
settlement process with Sony BMG will each receive $316,538, while the rest will get
$5,000.").
135 Ohio, 39 States Settle with Sony BMG over Anti-copying Software, supra note 131.
136 Press Release, ALCEI, Legal Proceedings in Italy by ALCEI Against Sony for a
"Criminal" Offense: In a Frenzy of Attempts to Prevent Music Reproduction, Sony BMG
Entertainment Distributes Dangerous Software (Nov. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.alcei.org/?p=22.
137 Id.
138 Sony BMG Settles FTC "Rootkit" Charges, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Jan. 31, 2001,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/newso4/2007/o1/ftc-sony-bmg.h tml.
139 Ingrid Marson, Sony Settles 'Rootkit' Class Action Lawsuit, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 29,
2005, http://news.com.com/Sony+settles+rootldt+class+action+lawsuit/21OO-1002__3-
6o12173.html.
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Entertainment,140 Michaelson v. Sony BMG Music, Inc., 141 Hull v.
Sony BMG Music Entertainment ("The EFF Suit"),142 and Bahnmaier
v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment,143 among others.144 On December
29, 2005, lawyers in Michaelson reached a settlement agreement
benefiting all affected persons in the United States.145 In the
settlement agreement, Sony agreed to immediately recall all of its CDs
containing the XCP software (but not the MediaMax software) and
replace them with unprotected CDs.146
Sony agreed to compensate consumers by allowing them to: either
(1) download three albums over the Internet or (2) download one
album and accept a $7.5o reimbursement.47 Sony also agreed to (1)
140 Guevara v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, No. BC342359 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2005). This
case sought relief for a class limited to California citizens and alleged violations of section
177o(a) of the California Civil Code (misrepresentation), sections 22947.3 (taking control
of computer resources), and 17200 (unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices) of
the California Business and Professions Code. Complaint at 8-1o, Guevara, No.
BC342359, available at http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/guevara/complaint.pdf.
141 Michaelson v. Sony BMG Music, Inc., No. 05 CV 9575 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005).
This case was eventually consolidated with others as a national (federal) class action and
alleged violations of federal computer fraud law, common law trespass, and common law
fraud. Complaint at 12-14, Michaelson, No. 05 CV 9575 (NRB), available at
http://www.sonysuit.com/michaelson/complaint.pdf.
142 Hull v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, No. BC343385 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005). This
case, filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, was another class action for Californians
and alleged similar violations to the Guevara case, and added claims for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under California contract law and false or
misleading statements in violation of section 175oo of the California Business and
Professions Code. Complaint at 23-28, Hull, No. BC343385, available at
http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/eff/complaint.pdf.
'43 Bahnmaier v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, No. CJ 2005 o6968 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28,
2005). This case was a class action for Oklahoma residents and included claims for
negligence, trespass to chattels, fraud, invasion of privacy, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, and violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. Complaint at
12-15, Bahnmaier, No. CJ 2005 o6968, available at
http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/bahnmaier/complaint.pdf.
144 See Mark Lyon, Class Action Lawsuits, SoNYSUrr.coM, Nov. 30, 2005,
http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/.
'45 Marson, supra note 139.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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cease production of CDs with the harmful DRM software; (2) provide
technical support to correct any vulnerabilities (presently known or
later discovered) caused by the software; (3) not collect any personally
identifiable information about consumers through the software; (4)
destroy any other information collected by the software after ten days;
(5) initiate an independent investigation regarding its collection of
personal information; (6) waive several provisions of the XCP and
MediaMax EULAs; (7) ensure that future DRM software (until 2008)
installs on consumer computers pursuant to active consent by the
consumer; (8) provide uninstallation software for DRM software
(until 2008); (9) provide clear and accurate EULAs for DRM software
and submit those EULAs to independent review (until 2008); (I0)
submit future DRM software to an independent reviewer and obtain
an opinion that the software is safe for consumers (until 2008); and
(11) provide notice that a CD contains DRM software on the CD's
packaging materials.4 8
Canadian plaintiffs filed similar class actions against Sony in their
country.,49 The settlement agreement in those cases initially mirrored
the United States version, with the exclusion of the provisions in the
United States regulating Sony's future use of DRM software (e.g.,
independent review requirements for DRM software and the
accompanying EULA).50 The Canadian Internet Policy and Public
Interest Clinic ("CIPPIC") quickly objected, and the Canadian court
hearing the case required Sony to provide notice to Canadian class
counsel and CIPPIC if it uses any DRM software in the future that has
not been independently evaluated and verified as safe for consumer
use.15' In addition, the CIPPIC filed complaints with five government
agencies, effectively voiding Sony's main rationale for not including
148 Settlement Agreement at 20-29, In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig., No. 1:05-CV-09575
(NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/michaelson/settle.pdf.
149 Michael Geist, Sony Hit with Canadian Class Action Suits, Jan. 5, 20o6,
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=io62&Itemi
d=89&nsub.
150 Canadian Sony Rootkit Settlement Misses the Mark, EFFECrol, Sept. 13, 2006,
http://w2.eff.org/effector/19/35.php (scroll midway down the page to see the article).
151 Calling Sony BMG's Bluff. Canadian Rootkit Settlement Improved, EFFECTOR, Sept. 25,
20o6, http://w2.eff.org/effector/19/37.php (scroll to the bottom third of the page to see
the article).
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the injunctive provisions from the U.S. settlement agreement in the
Canadian settlement agreement. 152
F. THE TEXAS AND CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWSUITS
Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott filed a lawsuit against Sony
on behalf of the state of Texas on November 21, 2005.153 The lawsuit
claimed that Sony's DRM software had violated the Texas Spyware
Act; specifically, the XCP software's rootkit attributes-hiding files,
installing without user consent, monitoring user activities, and
difficulty of removal-raised Abbott's suspicions and prompted the
Texas suit.54 One month later, Abbott amended the claims of the
lawsuit to include allegations that Sony's failure to adequately disclose
the nature of its software to consumers violated the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.155
Sony settled the Texas lawsuit and a similar California lawsuit on
December 19, 2006.156 In the settlement, Sony agreed to pay each
state $750,000 in damages and expenses and refund up to $175 to
each consumer harmed by Sony's DRM software.157 Sony also agreed
to "destroy any existing CDs embedded with the problematic DRM
technology, continue working to withdraw those CDs from the
marketplace, and submit to independent, third-party monitoring of
any software-enhanced music CDs for the next five years." 158
152 Id. Sony had previously argued that it agreed to provisions regulating future DRM
software use in the United States under mounting pressure from state investigations;
before CIPPIC filed complaints in Canada, Sony had not felt any governmental pressure in
that country. Id.
153 Abbott Press Release, supra note 7.
154 Id.
155 Press Release, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, Attorney General Abbott Slaps Sony
With New Spyware Violations (Dec. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.phpid=137o.
156 Jennifer LeClaire, Sony Antes Up $1.5 Million to Settle DRM Suits, TECHNEWSWORLD,
Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/5484o.html.
157 Id.
158Id.
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G. THE LIBRARlAN OF CONGRESS'S EXEMPTION BASED
ON THE SONY CD COPY PROTECTION SCANDAL
On November 27, 2006, pursuant to the DMCA, the Librarian of
Congress issued a narrow exemption based largely on the facts of the
Sony CD copy protection scandal.159 Essentially, for the three-year
period following that date, the DMCA's prohibition against
circumvention of technological measures that effectively control
access to copyrighted works will not apply to people making a
noninfringing use of a copyrighted work that falls into the following
class:
Sound recordings, and audiovisual works associated with
those sound recordings, distributed in compact disc format
and protected by technological protection measures that
control access to lawfully purchased works and create or
exploit security flaws or vulnerabilities that compromise the
security of personal computers, when circumvention is
accomplished solely for the purpose of good faith testing,
investigating, or correcting such security flaws or
vulnerabilities. 1o
The Register of Copyrights noted that this exemption was directly
related to the facts of the Sony CD copy protection scandal.' 61 The
Register also noted that, while it was possible that the type of activity
exempted may have already been allowed under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j),
the applicability of § 12010) was unclear.162 Recognizing the
seriousness of the problem posed by the Sony CD copy protection
scandal and the need for researchers to engage in the excluded
activities, the Register recommended this limited exclusion, which the
Librarian of Congress subsequently adopted.163 While the exemption
is a step towards providing consumer protection from DRM misuse, it
is far too narrow.
159 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68, 472-80 (Nov. 27, 20o6) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
201).
160 Id. at 473-74.
161 Id. at 472-80.
162 Id. at 477.
163 Id. at 479.
[Vol. 4:1
STANLEY
H. SONY STRIKES BACK
On July 3, 2007, Sony BMG filed a lawsuit against SunComm
(now known as the Amergence Group, Inc.), producer of the
MediaMax DRM software, in the Supreme Court of New York for New
York County. 164 The lawsuit sought $12 million in damages from
SunComm for breach of contract, false advertising, unfair and
deceptive acts and practices, negligence, and indemnification under
the software license agreement between the two companies. 165 It
appears that Sony BMG has voluntarily discontinued the suit.
66 If it
had reached trial, the lawsuit likely would have explored interesting
evidence regarding the respective amounts of knowledge that Sony
BMG and SunComm had regarding the effect that the MediaMax
DRM software would have on consumers and the amount of testing
that Sony and SunComm subjected the software to before making the
decision to introduce it to the marketplace. Moreover, the lawsuit
would have considered several unsettled legal issues, including (1)
various factors contributing to fault or providing defenses to liability
for these types of claims; (2) the level of care required of a software
developer that develops defective DRM software with the knowledge
that it will reach consumers; (3) the level of care required of a
copyright owner that makes the decision to make defective DRM
software available for public consumption; and (4) the appropriate
apportionment of fault between such DRM software developers and
copyright owners.
IV. MANAGING DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
The Sony CD copy protection scandal provides an example of an
attempt by a copyright owner to use DRM technology that went
astray. Although some copyright holders are beginning to experiment
164 Sony BMG Sues CD Software Firm, HOLLYWOOD REP., July 12, 2007,
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content-display/business/news/e3i214c26acb62c
59b679bbbc3594def8o6.
165 Summons at 1-2, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Amergence Group Inc., No. 07602201
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2007), available at
http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/CPDF?CatID=25o946&CID=6o22o1-
2007&FName=o.
166 County Clerk Minutes, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Amergence Group Inc., No.
07602201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2007), available at
http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/CCMinutes.jsp?IndexNo=6022o-200 7 .
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with distributing their content without DRM technology,167 DRM will
most likely continue to be used in a wide variety of contexts for the
foreseeable future. As evidenced by the Sony products, the potential
remains to misuse DRM, and it is imperative to determine whether
currently existing law is sufficient to prevent or deter such DRM
misuse in the future.
A. THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT DIGITAL
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT REGULATION
Proponents of the view that DRM does not need to be regulated
argue that the federal government should remain neutral on DRM.168
To achieve this neutrality, these proponents would require that
Congress amend the DMCA to prohibit circumvention for the purpose
of copyright infringement only.169 Advocates of government neutrality
state that requiring the government to oversee and regulate DRM
would be too costly and expensive.170 Conversely, neutrality advocates
believe that DRM regulation is unnecessary because the market
reaction to DRM schemes will cause intellectual property owners to
change their DRM policies accordingly, or perhaps do away with DRM
altogether.171
However, overly intrusive DRM schemes continue to violate
consumers' rights. The Sony CD copy protection scandal, described in
this comment, provides one example of DRM software that violates
both of these rights.172 In another example of intellectual property
owners' apparent willingness to violate consumer rights, Twentieth
Century Fox shipped the German version of its Mr. & Mrs. Smith DVD
with a DRM scheme having rootkit-like attributes similar to Sony's.73
167 Candace Lombardi, iTunes Goes DRM-Free with EMI, CNET NEWS.COM, May 30,2007,
http://www.news.com/iTunes-goes-DRM-free-with-EMI/2100-1027-3-6187457.html.
168 McCullagh & Homsi, supra note 24, at 327.
169Id.
170Id. at 324-25.
171 Id. at 326-27 (describing various consumer reactions and the corresponding effect on
intellectual property owners' DRM policies).
172 1d.
173 Ryan Naraine, Mr. &Mrs. Smith DVD Ships with Rootkit-like DRM, eWEEK, Feb. 14,
2oo6, http://www.eweek.com/article2/o,1795,1926917,oo.asp.
1Vol. 4:1
Symantec also recently shipped its Norton Systemworks software with
rootkit-like functionality.74 In light of continuing use of DRM
schemes to violate the rights of others, a proposal for a new regulatory
scheme may prove useful.
1. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING REMEDIES
Federal statutory remedies for future cases similar to the Sony CD
copy protection scandal include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.175 For example, the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act could address almost all activity that meets common
definitions of spyware so long as the activity results in aggregate loss
of over $i,ooo in a one-year period.176 Alternatively, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act could provide a remedy for interception
or access of electronic communications by overreaching DRM
software.177 Finally, the FTC has utilized the Federal Trade
Commission Act to bring claims of deceptive trade practices against
spyware producers, and could likely do the same to copyright owners
who utilize overreaching and deceptive DRM.78
State and common law remedies include state deceptive trade
practices acts, anti-spyware legislation, unfair competition statutes,
and common law concepts such as trespass to chattels and
conversion.179 To the extent that DRM technology in the future fails to
disclose material aspects of its operation, acts deceptively, causes
damage to consumer electronics devices and computers, or "spies" on
consumers, such state law theories may well provide a basis for
recovery.1So
174 Ryan Naraine, Symantec Caught in Norton 'Rootkit'Flap, eWEEK, Jan. 11, 2006,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/o,1795,191oo77,oo.asp.
'7- Crawford, supra note 16, at 1464-68.
176 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
177 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2712 (1986).
178 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2004) (declaring unlawful
"unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.").
'79 Crawford, supra note 16, at 1466-68.
180 d.
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There are several problems, however, with relying on current law
as the sole means of controlling DRM misuse. To the extent that state
laws attempt to regulate copyrighted material and protection
technologies protected by the DMCA, such state laws may be
preempted by the Copyright Act, which "is expressly intended to
create a federal law of uniform, nationwide application by broadly
preempting state statutory and common-law copyright regulation."181
Furthermore, any attempt to regulate DRM as spyware-to the extent
that such regulations involve transmissions of information over the
Internet-will affect at least some interstate commercial activity and
may be subject to challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause.182
Anti-spyware and other state legislation applied to DRM technology
will also result in inconsistent regulations between the states,
increasing the difficulty of compliance and the likelihood that such
legislation will make courts "uncomfortable."183
In addition to these issues with the application of state law to
DRM misuse, several practical difficulties exist that may render
current law ineffective to prevent or deter DRM misuse. In order for
any of the existing laws to be enforced, abusive DRM must first be
detected and the source of the abusive DRM must be determined. The
ability of software developers to develop undetectable DRM
technology, and the almost indistinguishable similarities between
DRM and spyware, poses a serious threat to the effectiveness of
existing law.
Even if abusive DRM has been detected, in order for existing law
to provide redress for the effects of such DRM, potential plaintiffs
must have funds to hire an attorney to litigate against the entity
responsible for the abusive DRM, or find an attorney willing to take
the case on a contingent-fee basis. The relatively low amount of actual
damages available, length and cost of litigation, and-in most cases-
vastly superior resources of the entity responsible for the abusive
DRM will be enough to deter many plaintiffs. With respect to
legislation that is enforceable only by a government actor, such as the
Federal Trade Commission Act and state anti-spyware legislation,
scarcity of government resources imposes a serious obstacle to
enforcement against all but the most egregious cases of DRM misuse.
181 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).
182 Crawford, supra note 16, at 1436.
183 Id. at 1444.
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Therefore, given the demonstrated challenges and perceived
ineffectiveness of existing law, regulation of DRM under the current
schemes does not seem advantageous. Furthermore, legislators likely
did not contemplate the potential for misuse of DRM technology when
they formulated the various laws that now govern. As a result,
application of such laws is insufficient to fully meet the unique
challenges of DRM regulation.
2. THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS'S EXEMPTION FROM DMCA LIABILITY
As noted above, the Librarian of Congress issued an exemption to
the DMCA in response to the Sony CD copy protection scandal. This
exemption may provide a disincentive for copyright owners to use
DRM technology which meets the definition provided in the
exemption by removing the benefit of legal protection from
circumvention. The exemption, however, is far too narrow to provide
adequate protection for consumers against DRM misuse in the future.
For example, the exemption applies only to "[s]ound recordings,
and audiovisual works associated with those sound recordings."184
Abusive DRM technology that protects any other category of
copyrightable work does not fall under the exemption, and there is,
therefore, no disincentive for copyright owners to use such DRM
technology with those works. In addition, the exemption is limited to
works "distributed in compact disc format."l85 Any abusive DRM
technology that accompanies, for example, a DVD, digital file, Blu-Ray
disc, or is integrated with consumer electronics devices does not fall
within the exemption. The exemption is overly specific with respect to
the type of abusive behavior that it discourages. For the exemption to
apply, the relevant DRM technology must "create or exploit security
flaws or vulnerabilities that compromise the security of personal
computers." 8 6 Abusive DRM behaviors other than those described by
the exemption, such as the collection of personal information, are not
covered. Furthermore, the exemption applies only to abusive DRM
that affects personal computers and not other consumer electronic
devices that may be equally threatened by the effects of abusive DRM.
184 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68, 472-8o (Nov. 27, 2oo6) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
201).
185 Id.
186Id
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Finally, the exemption relieves consumers from liability for
circumventing DRM technology that compromises their personal
computers, but does not, and cannot, provide a parallel exemption for
software developers who produce and traffic in technology to be used
for that purpose by consumers.18 7 "Without some availability of
circumvention tools, the DMCA exemptions will, in many cases,
extend rights to consumers while the anti-trafficking provisions [of
the DMCA] simultaneously deny them the means of exercising those
rights."88 Because the Librarian of Congress's exemption from DMCA
liability is so narrow, it does not provide an adequate solution to a
broad spectrum of potentially abusive DRM technologies, and is
therefore insufficient to protect consumers from the effects of DRM
misuse.
B. THE NATURE OF DRM REGULATION
1. GENERAL GUIDELINES
As opposed to the current regulatory patchwork of anti-spyware
legislation and cyber-crime statutes, an independent scheme should
regulate DRM measures. A regulatory scheme specifically targeting
DRM will provide intellectual property owners with notice of exactly
what standards their DRM software should meet. Currently,
intellectual property owners must guess at whether their DRM
software complies with various enacted state laws and pending federal
laws. Such a scheme should be implemented at the national level in
order to ensure consistency with existing copyright law and
uniformity of enforcement.189
187 Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving Standards & the Future of DMCA Anti-circumvention
Rulemaking, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 20 (2007).
188 Id. It should be noted that the DMCA does not grant the Librarian of Congress the
power to create exceptions to the anti-trafficking provisions. Compare 17 U.S.C. §
12o1(a)(1)(C) (2000) (commanding the Librarian of Congress to hold rulemaking
proceedings to determine whether the anti-circumvention provision has an adverse effect
on particular non-infringing use and providing that the anti-circumvention provision will
not apply to such uses), with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000) (prohibiting manufacturing,
importing, offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in technologies for
circumvention of technological measures but not providing a parallel ability for the
Librarian of Congress to create exceptions to these provisions).
8 9 See Cmty.for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 731 (discussing the uniformity goal of
the Copyright Act).
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Regulation at the national level will also help DRM regulation to
avoid any constitutional challenges based on the Dormant Commerce
Clause or preemption. Moreover, the argument that governments
should just allow the market to regulate DRM by providing anti-
spyware and security software to consumers is inapplicable because
the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA may make the use of
such software to remove or provide protection from DRM illegal.
Critics of the DMCA have argued that it is a mistaken attempt to
regulate technology, and that regulation of technology is often
ineffective, impossible to enforce, and has unintended consequences
that make such regulation more harmful rather than more helpful.19o
These critics hypothesize that the reason that regulation of technology
is ineffective, or even harmful, is that regulatory bodies have little
understanding of the technology that they regulate. Moreover,
technology advances so quickly that any attempt to regulate it will
necessarily fail to account for impending advances, and the law will be
unable to keep up with such advances as they occur.191 Despite such
arguments against regulation of technology, the reality of the situation
is that leaving consumer protection against DRM misuse to non-
regulatory forces will only serve to perpetuate the inequitable
situation that currently exists. Namely, the DMCA regulates
technology by prohibiting many consumer self-help activities, such as
the development and distribution of software that negates the effects
of DRM misuse, while providing protection to copyright owners who
use DRM. Even in the absence of official DRM "regulation," public
and private actors will continue to influence and regulate DRM
technology through contracts and license agreements, private
litigation, public litigation (such as spyware legislation enforcement
actions by state attorneys general), and governmental investigations.
Taken as a whole, in the limited context of DRM regulation, the
overriding concern for the general population of consumers should be
for their safety and privacy, and not the advancement of technology.
In other words, the advancement of technology may be a legitimate
interest that the law should not unduly regulate, but a copyright
owner that distributes DRM technology to the public should not be
allowed to advocate unbridled advancement of technology in lieu of
appropriate testing and design.
19o See Stephen J. Bigelow, Government Attempts to Regulate Technology: Efforts To
Control Often Do More Harm Than Good, PROCESSOR, Nov. 12, 2004, at 11, available at
http://www.processor.com/editorial/article.asp?article=articles%2Fp2646%2F21p 4 6%2F
21p46.asp.
191 Id.
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Commentators have argued both for and against allowing federal
agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"),
to regulate intellectual property owners' use of DRM technology.192
Critics argue that allowing governmental actors to implement complex
regulations could prove to be extremely costly because governmental
actors perform tasks at two to three times the cost of independent
actors. 193 Furthermore, many past attempts to reconcile DRM with
fair use have resulted in complex systems for determining when and
how to allow fair use over DRM technology, such as: (1) "Digital
Property Trusts"; (2) third-party decision-makers issuing "keys" for
circumventing DRM technology in appropriate circumstances; (3)
circumvention technology regulations modeled after firearms
regulations; and (4) "modular design" and other mandates designed to
ensure that DRM technologies do not bar consumers from access
copyrighted works for fair uses or after the copyright term has
expired.'94 The most inexpensive, elegant, and effective approach to
regulation of DRM technology may be a combination of proposals.195
2. CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
The DMCA was enacted to give effect to the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty, which states:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors in
192 Compare Chad Woodford, Comment, Trusted Computing or Big Brother? Putting the
Rights Back in Digital Rights Management, 75 U. CoLO. L. REV. 253, 291 (2004)
(proposing an FCC-implemented model DRM regulation), with McCullagh & Homsi, supra
note 24, at 324 (criticizing proposals for government-implemented DRM regulations as
failing to consider the potentially great cost to the public).
193 McCullagh & Homsi, supra note 24, at 324.
194Id. at 320-22.
195 Voluntary self-regulation by the DRM industry could provide an equally effective and
less costly alternative to regulation by the federal government. Cf. Adam D. Theirer,
Regulating Video Games: Parents or Uncle Sam?, CATO.ORG, July 14, 2003,
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub.id=3167 (describing the success of the
Entertainment Software Ratings Board system for rating computer game content, noting
that Senator Joseph Lieberman has called it "'a model' for other industries to follow," and
comparing the self-regulatory system favorably to parallel regulatory attempts by the
federal government).
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connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty
or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of
their works, which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law.196
This broad directive allows for flexibility in implementation so long as
it is not so restrictive that it prevents a WIPO member country from
providing "adequate" legal protection in compliance with the Treaty.197
The WIPO Copyright Treaty does not require specific legislation, and
as a result, some countries have determined that their existing law
provides adequate protection to meet its requirements.198 Member
states are not prevented from choosing to provide a wide array of
different legal standards to adequately protect technological
measures. 199  For example, the European Union Directive on
Copyright encourages member states to permit private copyright
owners to establish specific exceptions through practice before
enacting exceptions into national law.200 European Union member
states have subsequently adopted such independently tailored pieces
of national-level legislation.2o1 The most notable deviation in these
national European copyright laws is that of France, which was recently
amended to impose interoperability requirements on DRM technology
used in that country and to establish a regulatory body to enforce the
law.202
196 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 11 Stat.
2860,36 I.L.M. 65 (1996).
197 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switz. Nov. 3-5, 2003, STANDING
COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr-io/sccr_1o2rev.doc.
198 Id.
199 See id.
200 Id. at 72.
201 Id. at 77-79.
202 Nicolas Jondet, DRM Watchdog Established in France, FRENCH-LAW.NET, Apr. ii,
2007, http://French-law.net/index.php?option=com-content&task=viewid
=37&Itemid=1. The regulatory body's main concerns are ensuring interoperability of
works protected by DRM with various consumer devices and ensuring that DRM measures
doe not preclude lawful uses. Id. The regulatory body is staffed by independent officials
from various areas of the French government, including members of French courts.
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Australia's implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty is said
to be more favorable to consumers than other implementations.2o3
For example, the Australian Copyright Amendment ("Digital Agenda")
Act 2000 does not specifically prohibit circumvention, but instead
focuses on technologies and devices that permit circumvention.204
Japanese copyright law is similar in that it does not specifically
prohibit circumvention.205
As demonstrated by its WIPO counterparts, it would seem that the
United States could, without straying from its duties under the WIPO
Treaty, independently establish a regulatory framework that requires
DRM designers to consider consumer interests when developing new
technologies. Additionally, France's imposition of interoperability
requirements illustrates that government regulation of DRM in the
United States might be well received by other countries. Although no
set of standards currently exists mandating that DRM technology be
designed so as to not violate consumer rights, the United States could
exemplify emergent consumer-friendly regulations to other countries.
Furthermore, given the size and importance of the U.S. market, and
its thriving intellectual property regime, mandating that DRM
technology meet certain consumer-safe standards in the United States
could have a beneficial impact on DRM technology used in other
countries.
C. REGULATION BASED ON SONY SETTLEMENTS
1. GUIDELINES
Professor Michael Geist of the University of Ottawa argues that the
settlements from the Sony case should form the blueprint for new
DRM regulations.20 6 The Sony class action settlements restricted
Sony's behavior in several ways that would be applicable to an
industry-wide regulatory scheme for DRM technology.207 Model
guidelines based on some of those restrictions could be written as
follows:
203 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 197, at 85.
204 Id. at 85-86.
205 Id. at 91.
206 Geist, supra note 20.
207d
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Any protection technology accompanying digital forms of
copyrightable works must:
i. Interact with, install on, or otherwise integrate with,
a consumer electronic device only after the
consumer has provided active consent to the
interaction, installation, or other means of
integration, provided that such consumer electronic
device provides consumers with the ability to
consent to such interaction, installation, or other
integration;
2. Be capable of complete uninstallation from a
consumer electronic device in a manner that is
reasonably apparent and easily executed by
consumers;
3. Display a clear, accurate, and concise EULA and
require the consumer to agree to all material terms
prior to the interaction, installation, or other means
of integration of the protection technology on a
consumer electronic device;
4. Not hide files or other elements associated with the
protection technology, change file names, or tamper
with consumer electronic device attributes other
than as required for installation, uninstallation, and
normal, nondeceptive purposes related to the display
of the copyrighted material; and
5. Transmit or collect no personally identifiable
consumer information.
Owners of copyrighted material seeking to use any
protection technology in conjunction with a copyrightable
work in digital form must:
A. Submit the EULA describing the terms of use of
the copyrighted work and protection technology to a
third-party evaluator and obtain an independent
opinion that the EULA is clear, accurate, concise,
and reasonable;
2008]
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B. Submit protection technology to a third-party
evaluator and obtain an independent opinion that
the technology is safe for consumers;
C. Provide notice to prospective consumers that the
copyrightable work is accompanied by protection
technology and include a description of how the
protection technology will affect the consumer's use
of the copyrightable work in comparison to
established expectations for that type of work, in
that type of medium; and
D. Submit the notice to be provided to prospective
consumers to a third-party evaluator and obtain an
independent opinion that, prior to purchase by
consumers, the notice adequately discloses the fact
that protection technology accompanies the
copyrightable work and sufficiently describes the
effects of such protection technology on consumer
use of the copyrightable work in comparison to
established expectations for that type of work, in
that type of medium.
These guidelines provide a blueprint and fair summary of the
relevant terms of the Sony class action settlement agreement.
Professor Geist recognizes that a model statute based on the Sony
settlement would provide consumers with protection parallel to the
protection that the DMCA affords copyright owners though its anti-
circumvention provisions.208
The cost of third-party evaluation of EULAs and technology found
in the above model statute should be borne by intellectual property
owners as part of the cost of developing DRM technology since it is the
intellectual property owners who enjoy increased efficiency by
utilizing DRM technology. Providing for less expensive third-party
evaluation, instead of governmental agency intervention, and
requiring intellectual property owners to front the evaluation costs,
should allay the fears critics who decry the potential expense of
proposed regulations.209 Finally, the proposed regulation is limited in
scope to what is required to protect consumers from overly intrusive
208 Id.
209 See McCulagh & Homsi, supra note 24, at 324.
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DRM technology and does not attempt to impose the complex
technological design requirements feared by DRM regulation
critics.21o
2. POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATIONS
One possible means of implementing the above guidelines would
be to amend the DMCA to define "technological measure" as any
device, software, or other means for controlling use of a work by
consumers, as long as such technological measure has also been
developed, tested, and certified according to the guidelines.211 As a
result, copyright owners would have to prove that they have developed
a technological measure pursuant to the guidelines as a part of
showing that a defendant has violated the anti-circumvention or anti-
trafficking provisions of the DMCA. In other words, copyright owners
would not be able to prove that a defendant had circumvented (or
trafficked in circumvention technology) a technological measure
without also proving that the technological measure in question meets
the amended DMCA's definition. The effect of this implementation
would be to protect consumers from abusive DRM by providing a
disincentive for copyright owners to utilize technological measures
that have not been safely designed, appropriately tested, or that
provide inadequate notice to consumers. While this implementation
is an indirect method of regulating DRM abuse, it may be enough to
encourage the production of consumer-safe DRM.
Such an implementation is attractive because it would not require
the establishment or funding of a regulatory body to ensure that new
DRM technologies conform to the guidelines. Instead, this
implementation would place the determination of whether a specific
technological measure has conformed to the guidelines in the hands of
a federal judge. Because federal judges receive lifetime appointments,
they are more likely to be impartial in determining whether a
copyright holder's acts in producing and using its DRM technology
have conformed to the guidelines and, consequently, less likely to be
susceptible to corporate capture.212
210 See id.
211 The DMCA does not currently define "technological measure."
212 In this context, corporate capture refers to the likelihood that special interests (such as
copyright owners) will exert disproportionate influence over a decision maker.
2008]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
One disadvantage of relying on federal judges to determine
whether a technological measure is in compliance with the guidelines
is that many federal judges may not have sufficient technical training
to determine whether the testing and certification of various aspects of
a specific DRM technology have met the legal requirements. Another
disadvantage of relying solely on judges to makes this determination
is the likelihood that copyright owners seeking to sue under the
DMCA will engage in forum shopping in a quest to find a judge more
likely to favorably interpret the newly amended DMCA definition.
An alternative scheme to implement the guidelines would be to
enact a statute actively requiring that copyright owners wishing to use
DRM technology conform with the guidelines prior to making the
technology available to consumers. Under such a mode of
implementation, the copyright owner would have to conform its
behavior to meet the guideline standards prior to using DRM
technology. Review of the technology by a regulatory body would then
take place pursuant to one of two possibilities. The first possibility
would be that the regulatory body would review a copyright holder's
compliance with the guidelines upon receiving complaints from
consumer through an exercise of its discretion. Enforcement could be
achieved by in-depth investigation of suspicious cases, or through
random audits of copyright owners. The second possibility would be
that the regulatory body would require copyright owners to provide
notice of intent to introduce a new DRM technology to consumers,
whereupon the regulatory agency would review evidence submitted by
the copyright owner to determine whether the technology complies
with the guidelines before granting approval for the copyright owner
to proceed. Penalties for failure to comply with the regulatory scheme
could include loss of copyright, loss of right to sue for circumvention
or trafficking, sanctions on the use of the DRM technology, or fines.
One advantage of such a mode of implementation is that it would
designate a single body to apply the guidelines, promote uniformity,
and increase predictability for copyright owners developing
consumer-safe DRM technology. In addition, use of a single
regulatory body to oversee compliance will eliminate the forum
shopping problem previously discussed; however, care would have to
be exercised in selecting members of the regulatory body to minimize
the likelihood of corporate capture. Adopting France's approach in
determining the composition of the regulatory body may be useful in
avoiding the possibility of corporate capture. 213 A significant
213 See Jondet, supra note 202.
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disadvantage of this implementation strategy is that valuable
resources must be expended to establish and fund the regulatory
body.
D. FAIR USE AND COPYRIGHT TERM EXPIRATION
Critics of DRM and the DMCA have long complained that DRM
technologies inhibit consumer access to copyrighted works for fair use
after the copyrighted work has entered the public domain. A model
statute attempting to address DRM in its entirety should address
these issues as well.24 Many commentators have formulated complex
systems for resolving the conflict between the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions and fair uses allowed by the Copyright Act.
A simpler and more elegant solution would be to amend the DMCA to
make fair use and other defenses available under the Copyright Act
available as defenses to charges of circumvention and trafficking in
circumvention technology.215
V. CONCLUSION
Congress and the judiciary have implicitly endorsed DRM and
similar intellectual property protection measures. While such
technological self-help is undoubtedly a valid exercise of rights for
intellectual property owners, the Sony CD copy protection scandal
illustrates the outer limits of such rights. When intellectual property
owners exercise their right to technological self-help in such a way
that violates consumer privacy and property rights, they go too far.
While state governments and individual consumers have been able
to combat intrusive DRM technology by labeling it as spyware or
applying existing legal principles, there are potential problems with
anti-spyware legislation and other currently existing remedies.
Therefore, it is a dubious means for regulating the overall scope and
impact of DRM technology. Furthermore, currently existing
legislation and other legal principles are not an appropriate method
for addressing DRM because of the unique intersection of consumer
rights, intellectual property rights, and cyber-crime that DRM
presents. Any attempt to regulate DRM must fully consider the
delicate balance between consumer rights and intellectual property
holders' interests in protecting copyrightable works.
214 Woodford, supra note 192, at 291-95 (2004).
215 See McCullagh & Homsi, supra note 24, at 327.
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To this end, this comment suggests solutions that may provide a
blueprint for more complete DRM regulation in the future. While the
suggestions in this comment may be incomplete and could be further
developed, they describe the general attributes of DRM regulations
and the obstacles that such regulations must overcome to allay
common criticisms and effectively combat current abuses. These key
features include federal implementation of an amended statutory
scheme, a simple regulatory regime, and appropriate allocation of the
costs to regulate DRM technology. The proposed model regulation
provides enhanced consumer protection from potential DRM
technology abuses by mandating notice to consumers that a product is
protected by DRM technology, requiring clear EULAs, and prohibiting
certain deceptive uses of DRM technology. Furthermore, the
proposed regulation requires that intellectual property owners
wishing to use DRM technology submit the technology and
accompanying EULA to third-party evaluators and obtain certification
that the technology is safe and that it does not infringe others'
intellectual property. Essentially, the accompanying EULA must be
clear, concise, and accurate.
This comment suggests that Congress amend the DMCA to restore
consumer rights under copyright law, and reverse the limitations of
DRM technology that deny consumers legal defenses such as fair use
and other recourse under the Copyright Act. Restoration of the
appropriate balance between consumer rights and intellectual
property owner rights is attainable, and as this Comment
demonstrates, there are practical means to avoid the unnecessary
costs and complications that are often associated with effecting
legislative change.
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